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et al.: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. ERISA

PRE-EMPTS STATE COMMON-LAW CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

In Baker Hospital v. Isaac1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
joined the majority of other jurisdictions by holding that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 pre-empts state
claims arising out of the administration of employee bencommon-law
3
efit plans.

Baker Hospital (the Hospital) treated Joan Isaac, an employee of
Garden Art Landscaping, Inc. (Garden Art), for cocaine addiction. The
Hospital performed the treatment only after both Isaac and a representative of the Guardian Life Insurance Company (Guardian) allegedly assured the Hospital that Garden Art's employee benefit plan covered Isaac. The Hospital was not paid for its service and sued Isaac,
Garden Art, and Guardian to recover the payment. The suit asserted
four common-law causes of action: breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence, and misrepresentation. The Hospital sought punitive damages on the misrepresentation claim."
Immediately before the trial, Guardian moved to dismiss the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the theory that ERISA preempted the common-law causes of action. The trial court denied the
motion and Guardian appealed.5
The Hospital and Guardian stipulated that ERISA pre-empts the
common-law claims. The court agreed that Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux8 and "the clear majority rule in other jurisdictions on this
issue" establish that ERISA pre-empts the Hospital's common-law
claims.7 The court cited Dedeaux for the proposition that ERISA preempts any state law that relates to employee benefit plans" and that
the pre-emptive effect of ERISA is "deliberately expansive." The

1. 301 S.C. 248, 391 S.E.2d 549 (1990).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
3. Baker Hospital, 301 S.C. at 250, 391 S.E.2d at 550-51.
4. Id. at 249, 391 S.E.2d at 550.
5. Id.
6. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
7. Baker Hospital, 301 S.C. at 250, 391 S.E.2d at 550-51.
8. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 500 (citing Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 45).
9. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 46).
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court noted that Dedeaux specifically pre-empted causes of action for
breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim. 1°
The court also cited authority for the proposition that ERISA preempts misrepresentation and negligence causes of action.'1
On its face, the pre-emptive effect of ERISA is very broad. ERISA
states that its "provisions. . .shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan."' 2 ERISA defines "State law" as "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State."' 3
A dispute regarding the limit of ERISA pre-emption generally occurs because of the inclusion of a saving clause in the code. The saving
clause states that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
' 4
insurance, banking, or securities."
Therefore, when a court addresses an ERISA pre-emption problem, the first question is whether the state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan. The second question is whether the law is saved by
virtue of being a regulation of insurance, banking, or securities. 5
In addressing the impact of ERISA pre-emption, courts have considered questions such as the limit of the pre-emption, the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial, and the availability of extracontractual or punitive
damages. Since Dedeaux, courts consistently have found that commonlaw claims are pre-empted if they arise out of a failure to pay claims
under an existing plan.' 6 Most courts have found that a right to a jury

10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Kuntz v. Reese, 7.60 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn and vacated
on other grounds, 785 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986); Board of
Trustees v. Continental Assurance Co., 690 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ark. 1988)). Because the

pre-emption issue involved the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction, the supreme
court also rejected the Hospital's assertion that Guardian failed to raise the pre-emption
issue in a timely manner. Id. at 250-51, 391 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Providence Hosp. v.
National Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162 Mich. App. 191, 412 N.W.2d 690 (Ct.

App. 1987)).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).

13. Id. § 1144(c)(1).
14. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
15, See generally Annotation, Construction and Application of Pre-emption Exemption, UnderEmployee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS § § 1001 et seq.),
for State Laws Regulating Insurance, Banking, or Securities (29 USCS § 1144(b)(2)),
87 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1988) (providing an overview of pre-emption and pre-emption
exemption).

16, See, e.g., Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868 F.2d 430, 431 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam) (finding that common-law causes of action for fraud and bad faith failure to pay
a claim arising out of an alleged wrongful denial of claims under an employee benefit
plan were clearly pre-empted by ERISA), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 158 (1989). In
HealthAmerica v. Menton, 551 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1166
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allowed
trial does not exist for claims under ERISA because the relief
17
is in the nature of an equitable rather than a legal remedy.
Finally, an award of extracontractual or punitive damages in an
ERISA action is unlikely. Plaintiffs often request punitive damages
based on the "appropriate relief" language of sections 1132(a)(2) s and
1132(a)(3).19 Section 1132(a)(2) is the enforcement provision for section 1109's liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Section 1132(a)(3) is,
however, a general private enforcement provision. In the leading case
of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell2 0 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that extracontractual damages are not21
available for an individual beneficiary suing under section 1132(a)(2).
The Court concluded that nothing in the legislative history supported
the availability of extracontractual damages;2 2 therefore, it was "reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident
care." 2 3 The Court expressly limited its holding to section 1132(a)(2)
and declined to address the availability of extracontractual or punitive
damages under
any other provision of ERISA, including section
2
1132(a) (3). 4
Aplying the logic of Russell, a majority of the circuit courts of appeals have held that section 1132(a)(3) also does not authorize extracontractual or punitive damages. 25 In Powell v. Chesapeake & Poto-

(1990), the Alabama Supreme Court distinguishea Dedeaux and held that fraudulent
inducement claims arising before an employee actually becomes covered by a plan are
not pre-empted. Id. at 239-40. The majority and dissenting opinions in this case provide
a fairly comprehensive survey of the scope of ERISA pre-emption.
17. See, e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (following "overwhelming precedent" that the Seventh Amendment provides no right to jury trial for claims brought under ERISA).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1988).
19. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
20. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
21. The Court apparently intended that its holding also should apply to punitive
damages. Id. at 136, 138, 144 n.12; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
53-54 (1987) (stating that Russell held that section 1132(a)(2) "provide[s] no express
authority for an award of punitive damages"). The Court did not decide whether section
1109, the breach of fiduciary duty section, authorizes a plan, rather than an individual,
to recover extracontractual or punitive damages. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 n.12; cf. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456,
1463 (5th Cir. 1986) (punitive damages not recoverable by a plan), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1089 (1987).
22. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-47.
23. Id. at 147.
24. Id. at 139 n.5.
25. Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824-25 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th
Cir. 1988); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987); Kleinhans v. Lisle Say.
Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532,
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mac Telephone Co.2 0 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
extracontractual and punitive damages are not available under the
general private enforcement provision of section 1132(a)(3). Noting
that strong support exists for the proposition "that Congress intended
to import into ERISA principles of trust law, '2 7 the Powell court
stated that extracontractual and punitive damages are "generally not
available in an action by a beneficiary against a trustee for breach of
trust." 8
In Baker Hospital the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
ERISA pre-empts common-law claims arising under employee benefit
plans. This pre-emption probably precludes trial by jury and disallows
any extracontractual or punitive damages. The unavailability of extracontractual or punitive damages may remove a traditional incentive
for fiduciaries to conform their actions to the high standards required
of them. Whether this removal has the effect of lowering the quality of
service owed to participants and beneficiaries of ERISA benefit plans
is uncertain.
David W. Plowden

II.

SUPREME COURT DISCUSSES DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

BASED ON EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK

In Small v. Springs Industries29 (Small II) the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed damages arising from the wrongful discharge of
an employee whose at-will employment contract was modified by an
employee handbook. The court previously decided in Small v. Springs
Industries ° (Small 1) that an employee handbook issued by an employer may alter an otherwise at-will employment relationship and
that a jury may consider the handbook as evidence of the modification 1 The Small II court held that wrongfully discharged employees
may refuse an offer of re-employment without suffering diminution of

538 (9th Cir. 1986); Corrigan Enterprises,793 F.2d at 1464-65; Powell v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
26. 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
27. Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (citations omitted). The court's reliance on trust law is appropriate. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. 300 S.C. 481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
30. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
31. Id. at 485-86, 357 S.E.2d at 455. For a discussion of Small I, see Annual Survey
of South CarolinaLaw, Implied ContractException to Employment At Will Doctrine
Recognized, 40 S.C.L. REv. 157 (1988).
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damages if their refusals are reasonable.3 2 The court also held that
wrongfully discharged employees that sue for breach of contract may
receive future damages caused by the employer's breach.33
Five years after Kathy Small began working for Springs Industries
(Springs), Springs distributed an employee handbook to all employees.
The handbook provided for a four-step disciplinary procedure for firing employees. Springs failed to follow the termination procedures in
discharging Small, and Small brought a breach of contract action. The
jury found that the handbook altered Small's at-will employment status, thus creating an employment contract. It also found that Springs
breached the contract by failing to follow the termination procedures
and that Springs was liable for the damages resulting from the breach.
The jury awarded Small three hundred thousand dollars in damages. 3'
In Small I the supreme court affirmed the verdict on the issue of
Springs's liability for its breach of contract, but reversed the jury's
award as excessive and remanded for a new trial on the damages issue. 85 On retrial the jury awarded Small
one hundred thousand dollars
36
in damages, and Springs appealed.

After the supreme court decision in Small I and prior to the trial
in Small II, Springs offered to reinstate Small to her previous position,
restore her seniority, waive normal pre-employment physical examination requirements, and expunge records of disciplinary actions from
her file. Springs did not condition its offer on settlement of
the pend37
ing litigation between the parties. Small refused the offer.
The Small II court first examined the status of the employmentat-will doctrine in South Carolina. At-will employment means that either the employee or the employer can terminate the employment relationship at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.38
Generally, an employer may terminate an employee that is working for
an indefinite period without the termination resulting in a cause of action for breach of contract. 39 The court recognized, however, that there
are judicial exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will in South
Carolina. 0

32. Small I, 300 S.C. at 485-86, 388 S.E.2d at 811.

33. Id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 812-13.
34. Small 1, 292 S.C. at 483, 357 S.E.2d at 453.

35. Id. at 486-87, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
36. Small II, 300 S.C. at 483, 388 S.E.2d at 810.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 484, 388 S.E.2d at 810 (citing Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981)).

39. Id. (citing Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979)).
40. Id. Legislation has further eroded the employment-at-will doctrine in South
Carolina. For example, the state has adopted a remedy for employees discharged in retal-

Published by Scholar Commons, 1991

5

South
Carolina
Law Review,
43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 10[Vol. 43
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW

The Small 11 court looked to traditional contract-law sources to
resolve the damages issues. It concluded that "[a] wrongfully discharged employee suing for breach of contract is entitled to receive the
amount of the employees' [sic] net losses caused by the employer's
breach. ...
Such losses may include back pay as well as future
''
damages. 141

As in other contract actions, plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases
have a so-called duty to mitigate damages. 42 Terminated employees
can recover only for losses that they, in the exercise of due diligence,
could not avoid. This doctrine of avoidable consequences requires discharged employees to use reasonable diligence to obtain other suitable
employment.43 Thus, a significant issue in Small II was whether a
wrongfully discharged employee must accept an offer of re-employment
in order to mitigate damages.
Generally, a wrongfully discharged employee must accept a good
faith, bona fide offer of re-employment. 44 For an offer of re-employment to be bona fide, it "must reinstate the employee to the same or a
substantially similar position at the same pay. The offer must not require the employee to waive his legal right to pursue his cause of action
for wrongful discharge.' 5 The employer has the burden of proving
that the offer is facially bona fide if it defends its liability for damages
on the8 theory that the plaintiff refused a bona fide re-employment
offer.

4

A bona fide re-employment offer does not, however, always limit
the employee's damages to the time of the offer.' 7 If an employee has
reasonable grounds to refuse the offer, "such as where something has
occurred to render further association between the parties offensive or

iation for instituting workers' compensation proceedings, S.C. CODE ANN.§ 41-1-80 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990), and for compliance with a subpoena, id. § 41-1-70.
41. Small II, 300 S.C. at 484, 388 S.E.2d at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 455 (1958); 11 S.WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS §§ 1358,

1361 (3d ed. 1968)).
42. Although often referred to as a "duty to mitigate," it is not a duty in the legal
sense, nor is it a condition precedent to recovery. Rather, it is an issue that goes to the
appropriate measure of damages. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1095, at 518
(1964).
43. Small II, 300 S.C. at 484, 388 S.E.2d at 810 (citing S.

§ 1359; 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 42, § 1095;

WILLISTON,

supra note 41,

§ 455
comment d (1958)).
44. Id. at 485, 388 S.E.2d at 811 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 455
comment d (1958); S.WILLISTON, supra note 41, § 1359)).
45. Id. (citing Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N.W. 362 (1930);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY

University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1974)).
46. Id. (citing Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 252 Mich. 406, 233 N.W. 362 (1930)).

47. Id.
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degrading to the employee or where other circumstances exist which
would make such a renewal of services inequitable,"' 849then the employee will not be subject to a diminution of damages.
Because Springs presented sufficient evidence of a facially bona
fide re-employment offer, the burden shifted to Small to show either
that the offer was not made in good faith or that her refusal of the
offer was reasonable.5 0 Small testified that when Springs fired her, she
pleaded for her job, but was told she would never work for Springs
again. She testified that Springs did not care for her and that it made
the offer in an attempt to minimize damages even though Springs
knew that it was wrong.51 The court held that Small's testimony was
sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether she reasonably refused Springs's offer52 of re-employment and whether Springs made the
offer in good faith.

In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Acting Associate Justice
Littlejohn strongly criticized the majority's finding that Small's testimony raised a jury issue. He believed the trial judge should have held
as a matter of law that Springs owed Small no further compensation
after she refused the re-employment offer. 53 "[T]he record is devoid of
any evidence [that] reinstatement under the terms offered would have
been inequitable." 54 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that Small's
damages were not limited to the date of Springs's re-employment offer
because the jury had found that the circumstances justified Small's rejection of the offer.
Springs also contended that the jury's award was improper because it included damages of a speculative nature. Springs argued the
damages were speculative because Small failed to establish how long
Springs would have continued to employ her absent the discharge. 5s
The court rejected Springs's argument and found that the one hundred
thousand dollar award fell "within the range of damage testimony

48. Id.
49. Id. at 485-86, 388 S.E.2d at 811. Springs argued that employees must either accept the employer's "facially unconditional offer of reemployment ... or suffer diminution of their damages awards, irrespective of the reasonableness or good faith of the offer." Id. at 486, 388 S.E.2d at 811. The court rejected this argument and reasoned that
the majority rule, recognized in South Carolina for over 150 years, is the better rule. Id.
(referring to Saunders v. Anderson, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 486 (1834)).
50. Id. at 487, 388 S.E.2d at 812.
51. Id. at 487-88, 388 S.E.2d at 812.

52. Id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 812.
53. Id. at 492, 388 S.E.2d at 814 (Littlejohn, Acting A.J., concurring and dissenting).
54. Id. at 491, 388 S.E.2d at 814.
55. Id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 812.

56. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1991

7

South
Carolina
Law Review,
43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 10
[Vol. 43
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REvIw
presented by Small's experts. '57
The Small II decision could have serious implications for employment relationships in South Carolina. If Small's unsupported testimony was sufficient to warrant a jury trial, it is difficult to imagine a
set of circumstances that will not raise a jury issue as to whether the
refusal of an offer of re-employment was unreasonable or whether the
employer made the offer in bad faith.
Furthermore, the determination of lost earnings seems speculative
and conjectural.5 8 No adequate mechanism exists to assist a jury in determining that a certain job will be available for a particular employee
in the future or that the employee will not work elsewhere after receiving an award for lost future earnings. Allowing unlimited earnings
when the contract is for an indefinite period leads to the incongruous
result that a wrongfully discharged at-will employee can receive greater
damages than a wrongfully discharged employee with a contract of
specified duration.
Unfortunately, the Small II holding increases the uncertainty and
instability of employment relationships already unsettled by the Small
I holding. Chief Justice Gregory warned of the potential adverse effects
of such decisions on South Carolina employers and employees in his
dissent to Small I: "[T] oday's holding, without promoting job security,
tends to stifle quality economic growth and development and hinder
expanded job opportunities in this State."'5 9
Stephen Coe

57. Id., 388 S.E.2d at 813.
58. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 251, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988)

("[I]t is inherently difficult to fix damages for the wrongful discharge of an employee
who is employed for an indefinite term."). But see Diggs v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling
Co., 861 F.2d 914, 921-24 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that under Michigan law future dam-

ages in wrongful discharge cases are not inherently speculative).
59. Small 1, 292 S.C. 481, 488, 357 S.E.2d 452, 456 (1987) (Gregory, C.J., dissenting).
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